Introduction
The challenge of labor market policy is to devise a framework for contracting between employers and workers that is at once efficient and fair. Most people would agree that excessively rigid labor market regulations prevent the labor market from operating efficiently. The resulting losses to employment and productivity therefore reduce opportunities for workers to find good jobs. Most people would also agree that some regulation is necessary to codify and protect basic standards of fair treatment for workers.
Regulations may also introduce a degree of predictability to, and reduce the cost of, contracting between employers and workers. The debate over the design of labor market policy centers on the question of how much and what kind of regulation is necessary to efficiently achieve these goals-and when regulation becomes "excessive".
There is considerable evidence that rigid labor regulations may prevent labor markets from operating efficiently. Botero, et. al. (2004) , for example, find that countries with heavier labor-market regulations have lower rates of labor-market participation and higher levels of unemployment. Besley and Burgess (2004) find that "pro-worker" labor reforms in India negatively affected employment and productivity and increased poverty. Amin (2008) also shows that labor regulation in India has substantial and negative effects on employment. Heckman and Pagés (2000) find that job security legislation in Latin America reduces employment and increases inequality. Almeida and Carneiro (2008) find that increased enforcement of labor regulations constrains firm size and reduces employment. Ahsan and Pagés (2008) find that employment protection reduces output and employment in the formal sector without benefitting workers. Kugler (2004) finds that a reduction in firing costs in Colombia reduced unemployment. A more complete review of the literature on the effects of labor regulations in developing countries can be found in Djankov and Ramalho (2008) . 1 There is also evidence that labor market regulations affect the labor market in ways that cannot be captured by aggregate employment statistics. Saavedra and Torero (2004) , for example, find that increases in firing costs reduce labor demand. Although they could not observe worker flows, they did find that a reduction of firing costs in Peru led to a decrease in mean tenure of workers. Kugler (2004) finds similar results. Bosch et. al. (2007) find that reduced labor market flexibility in Brazil led to an increase in informality, primarily due to a reduction in the job finding rate in the formal sector.
A burgeoning literature also shows that labor-market regulations affect the way jobs are distributed across firms. Caballero, et. al. (2006) , Gonzaga (2003) , , and Micco and Pagés (2007) all find that labor-market rigidities reduce the reallocation of jobs across firms. That is, labormarket rigidities cut off the constant churning of workers and jobs across firms that would otherwise occur naturally in a free market. Blanchard and Portugal (2001) arrive at a similar conclusion by comparing job creation and destruction rates in the U.S. and Portugal. They attribute the lower rates of job creation and destruction observed in Portugal to its employment-protection laws.
The papers mentioned above interpret the evidence that labor regulations reduce the pace of labormarket reallocations as evidence that labor regulations are impediments to productivity since they prevent workers from being allocated to the firms where they are most productive. One could, however, interpret the results of these papers as evidence that a substantial fraction of workers might be hurt by making labor regulations less rigid. The reallocation of jobs across firms generates losses for the workers who lose their jobs. A well-designed labor-market reform should take into account the short-term losses of workers who would likely be displaced from their jobs if labor markets are made more flexible. In fact, papers like Jacobson, et. al. (1993) suggest that, even in countries with flexible labor markets like the U.S., the negative effects of being a displaced worker may be permanent. This paper makes two contributions to the literature on labor regulations in developing countries.
The first contribution is to use a different methodology to confirm previous results in the literature that rigid labor regulations reduce aggregate employment. In particular, I exploit a unique data set that asks firms how many permanent workers would have been hired and fired in the previous fiscal year in absence of rigid labor regulations. Indeed I confirm that, on average, aggregate employment across 14 Latin American countries would increase by about two percent if labor regulations were made more flexible.
The second contribution, which relates these aggregate gains in employment to the changes in the hiring and firing of individual workers, is the main contribution of the paper. I find that countries that would gain most by making labor regulations more flexible in terms of aggregate employment, which tend to be those countries with more heavily regulated labor markets, would exhibit particularly large increases in worker dismissals. These particularly large increases in worker dismissals would be accompanied by even bigger increases in worker hires. Nevertheless, one may interpret these findings as saying that more heavily regulated labor markets have more people who would be hurt by the adoption of pro-market reforms.
A concrete example may make the above point clearer. Using an index of labor market rigidity that comes from the Economic Freedom of the World report issued by the Fraser Institute, Chile has the most flexible labor market among the 14 countries studied while Argentina has the least flexible labor market.
Firms in Chile report that, if labor regulations were made more flexible, the net gain to employment would be 0.76% while Argentinian firms report a net gain of 2.82% of total employment. This finding should not be surprising given the extensive literature that shows that making labor regulations more flexible generates gains to employment.
The focus of the current paper, however, is how these gains in net employment are accomplished.
Chilean firms report that the additional dismissals that would result from making labor regulations more flexible would be 0.94% of total employment, while Argentinian firms report an additional dismissal figure of 2.34%. We therefore see that, despite the fact that Argentina would gain more in terms of aggregate employment by reforming its more rigid labor regulations, Argentina would also see a higher percentage of its workers losing their jobs. The larger net employment gains in Argentina arise because their higher dismissal figures are more than compensated for by even higher figures for additional hires. 2 The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on worker and job reallocations and places the current paper into this broader literature. Section 3 describes the essential features of the data set used in the paper and documents the manner in which all variables are calculated. Section 4 presents the main empirical results. Section 5 presents evidence that some of the results from section 4 can be attributed to changing the status of temporary workers to permanent ones, but that the main conclusions of the paper hold even when firms that employ temporary workers are excluded from the analysis. Section 6 concludes.
Related Literature
The literature on worker and job reallocations has achieved considerable importance in recent years. The essential insight of the early papers such as Davis and Haltiwanger (1990 and 1992) is that aggregate statistics such as total employment, which may not vary much over time, mask considerable activity at the micro level. Even when aggregate employment does not change from one year to the next, one can observe individual firms being born or expanding dramatically at the same time when other firms are exiting the market or contracting dramatically.
In the parlance of the literature, we say that a firm creates jobs when the firm's employment in the current year is greater than in the prior year. We say that the firm has destroyed jobs when firm employment in the current year is lower than in the previous year. The key early insight of this literature is that an economy exhibits substantial rates of job creation and job destruction simultaneously. That is, even when aggregate employment is neither expanding nor contracting, an economy is always reallocating jobs at a rapid rate. The contributions mentioned above have changed dramatically the way we view labor markets. Even when aggregate employment is not changing, some firms are growing at the same time when others are shrinking. Even when firm employment is not growing or shrinking, employee turnover is still high.
By exploiting a data set in which firms are asked how many workers they would have hired and terminated in absence of rigid labor regulations, I examine the relationship between labor regulations and these flows. The effects of rigid labor regulations on net employment growth, which are studied in the current paper and have been studied extensively in the previous literature, play a central role in the policy debate over labor reforms. The effects of rigid labor regulations on worker flows (hires and fires), which is the novelty of the current paper, is also of crucial importance both for understanding the effects of the reforms and for understanding why pro-market labor reforms are often met with such opposition. This paper is the first that analyzes directly the effects of labor-market regulations on worker flows in Latin America. 3 Indeed, the descriptive statistics show that making labor regulations more flexible would have a larger impact on worker flows than on job flows. Since opposition to labor reforms likely stems from individuals who are afraid of being displaced, the focus on worker flows may be particularly relevant for policy. An individual worker fearing dismissal as a result of a labor reform would likely oppose the reform even if his or her firm would increase its total employment as a result of the reform.
Although I do not examine productivity in this paper, it is important to stress that these reallocations 
Data and Methodology
This paper uses data from 14 Latin American countries. The 14 countries are Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. The data can be accessed at www.enterprisesurveys.org. These countries were chosen for two reasons. First, the enterprise surveys data sets for these countries have weights that can be used to make the statistics representative of the population of non-agricultural and non-financial sector firms.
Second, the surveys applied to these 14 countries contain the main questions that will be used to generate all job-and worker-flow statistics used in the paper.
All firms were asked "In fiscal year 2005, would this establishment have hired or fired permanent workers had it not been for having to comply with labor regulations?" When a firm answered yes to this question, the firm was asked specifically how many workers would have been hired or fired. I also observe the number of full-time permanent employees who were employed in the last fiscal year. Table 1 presents some basic information about the firm-level data. In total, 10,396 firms were used in the analysis. Observations per country ranged from 436 in Honduras to 1,478 in Mexico. Statistics are weighted to give estimates of the population of all firms with at least five employees not in agriculture or the financial sector. Perhaps the most striking feature is that 83.2% of firms state that neither hiring nor firing decisions were affected by rigid labor regulations. The large informal economies in these countries may explain why so many firms say that their hiring and firing decisions are unaffected by labor regulations, since firms may be able to substitute informal workers for formal ones thereby avoiding the regulatory costs. According to the calculations presented in Schneider (2007) , the informal economy contributes an average of 44% to total GDP for the 14 countries studied here. Another possibility, which I will explore later in the paper, is that firms can substitute temporary workers for permanent workers.
Only 2.2% of firms said that rigid labor regulations affected their dismissal decisions but not their hiring decisions while 6.6% of firms said that rigid labor regulations affected their hiring decisions but not their dismissal decisions. Interestingly, 8.0% of firms said that rigid labor regulations affected both their hiring and their dismissal decisions. We will see later that, despite the fact that small percentages of firms state that rigid labor regulations affected their hiring or firing decisions, rigid labor regulations do have an important effect on aggregate employment.
The next step in the analysis is to calculate the job-and worker-flows statistics at the level of the country. In order to explain this procedure, I begin by defining some terms. Let the subscript c denote the country and let the subscript j denote the firm. Specifically, consider the following definitions:
empl cj = the number of full-time permanent employees in the last full fiscal year t for firm j in country c.
hire cj = the number of permanent employees that firm j in country c would have hired in fiscal year t in absence of rigid labor regulations.
fire cj = the number of permanent employees that firm j in country c would have let go in fiscal year t in absence of rigid labor regulations.
create cj = max(0, hire cj − fire cj ).
destroy cj = max(0, fire cj − hire cj ).
The term ] empl cj is the number of full-time permanent employees that firm j in country c would have In order to gain some intuition about what these statistics measure, consider the following example.
Suppose that, in absence of rigid labor regulations, firm A would have hired one employee and fired zero employees. Suppose further that firm B would have hired 100 employees and fired 99 employees.
For both firms A and B, it would be recorded that they would have created one job if labor regulations did not exist. Obviously their values for the number of workers that would have been hired and fired are dramatically different. We therefore see from this example that the number of jobs that would be created by making labor regulations more flexible and the number of people who would be hired might be substantially different things. An analogous example would show that the number of jobs destroyed and the number of people fired might be quite different as well.
Now that the relevant statistics have been defined at the firm level, I turn to how I aggregate up to the level of the country. If I had access to a census of firms, aggregation would be a simple matter of summing across all firms. Since different firms had different ex-ante probabilities of entering the sample, some firms "represent" more firms than do others. Now define w cj to be the inverse of the ex-ante probability that firm j in country c would appear in the sample. A simple interpretation for w cj is that it tells us the number of firms that are represented by firm j.
The first and most basic statistic is the net percentage increase in total employment that would have been achieved by making labor regulations more flexible. The formula is
The numerator of the formula should be straightforward. It is simply the amount (measured by number of permanent workers) that total employment would have increased if labor regulations had been more flexible. It is standard in the literature to define the denominator as the average of the two total employment observations. 4 The next statistic measures how much job creation would have been achieved if labor regulations were made more flexible. Recall that job creation can occur even if making labor regulations more flexible would have reduced aggregate employment in the economy. The formula is:
The above statistic on job creation is simply the sum of all increases in firm-level employment expressed as a percentage of total employment. We can define the analogous job destruction statistic as follows:
which is simply the sum of all decreases in firm-level employment expressed as a percentage of total employment. It is useful to note that
that is, we can express the net percentage change in employment as the percent of jobs created minus the percent of jobs destroyed.
As mentioned earlier, the statistics on jobs that would have been created and jobs that would have been destroyed in absence of rigid labor regulations ignore within-firm worker turnover. We therefore define the additional hires that would have occurred as a percentage of total employment as
and the additional fires that would have occurred as a percentage of total employment as
Recall that the net percentage change in employment could be decomposed into its job creation and job destruction components. Similarly, we can decompose the net percentage change in employment into its hiring and firing components as follows
It may also be useful to note that hire_perc c ≥ create_perc c and fire_perc c ≥ destroy_perc c .
I will present some of the results separately by industry and by firm size. These calculations are straightforward. For example, if one would like to calculate the above statistics only for the manufacturing sector, one simply needs to exclude all non-manufacturing firms from the data set and proceed as described above.
I will also make use of an indicator of labor market rigidity. I use the index from the The Economic There are, however, important differences across size categories. The net employment change of permanent workers that would occur if labor regulations were made more flexible would be 4.24% for small firms, 2.85% for medium-sized firms, and 1.27% for large firms. Despite the fact that smaller firms would benefit the most in terms of net employment growth if labor regulations were made more flexible, smaller firms would also experience more employee dismissals. Additional dismissals due to labor regulations becoming more flexible would amount to 2.55% of total employment for small firms,
Empirical Results
1.96% for medium-sized firms, and 1.30% for large firms. In this sense we can conclude that rigid labor regulations have a larger effect on small firms both in terms of net employment growth and in terms of worker turnover. These results are consistent with the results of Pierre and Scarpetta (2004) who find that small firms are least likely to say that labor regulations are no obstacle to their operation. It is for this reason that the coefficient of 0.45 from the aggregate regression is larger than any of the coefficients from the disaggregated models.
The second observation is to note that there are insignificant results using job destruction as the dependent variable. That is, the relationship between net growth and worker flows is stronger than the relationship between net growth and job flows. This result demonstrates that labor reform has important effects on worker turnover that are not being captured in papers that only study job flows such as Indeed figure 4 shows that Bolivia has an extremely large figure for job destruction that may confound the OLS models. Rank-order correlation models only take into account the rankings of the variables and not their actual values. The correlation coefficients are all positive and estimated to be 0.6 or higher.
Furthermore, they are all statistically significant at least at the 0.05 level. In this sense the rank-order correlation results are even stronger than the OLS results.
Temporary Workers
Recall that the main employment variables used in the paper refer to permanent workers. One therefore wonders the extent to which the effects documented in the previous section are the result of firms switching from temporary to permanent workers once rigid labor regulations are lifted. Unfortunately, firms are not asked whether the increased hires of permanent workers would be truly new employees or if the newly-hired permanent workers would come from their current pool of temporary workers. percentage point increase in temporary workers as a percent of employment, the net gain in permanent employment from making labor regulations more flexible rises by 0.13 percentage points. 5 Not surprisingly, the variable "temporary workers as a percentage of employment" has no effect in the job destruction model and has a statistically significant but small effect in the fire equation. The fact that the creation of permanent jobs and the hiring of permanent workers in response to labor reform disproportionately come from firms that employ large shares of temporary workers lends credence to the hypothesis that some of the new permanent workers would be workers who currently have temporary jobs.
The third column of table 5 presents the results of including the indicator of labor-market flexibility and the percent of the firm's workforce that is temporary or seasonal together in the same equation.
The interesting fact from these models is that the coefficients are nearly identical to those in the first two columns, which occurs because the two variables are essentially uncorrelated. 6 The fourth column adds an interaction term (the indicator of labor-market flexibility multiplied by the percent of the firm's workforce that is temporary or seasonal) to the models from column three.
Two interesting results emerge from including the interaction term. First, the interaction term's positive and significant coefficients in the equations for net growth, permanent job creation, and the hiring of permanent workers imply that the effects of labor reform disproportionately work through firms that currently rely heavily on temporary workers. It therefore appears that some of the effects of labor reform that were estimated in table 4 pick up firms changing the status of their temporary employees.
To understand the second result, note that the coefficient of the labor market indicator can now be interpreted as the effect that making regulations more flexible has on firms with no temporary employees. This effect in the net growth model is estimated to be positive but miniscule in magnitude and not statistically significant. The other conclusions from table 4, however, remain qualitatively unchanged although the magnitudes decrease somewhat. In particular, even for firms that currently have no temporary workers, making labor markets more flexible will yield larger increases in both hires and fires in countries that currently have more rigid labor markets.
As I mentioned earlier, there are statistical problems with these firm-level regressions. To address these concerns, I once again calculate country-level aggregates of all job-and worker-flow variables as described in the methodology section. This time, however, I exclude firms that have any temporary workers. In this way we can be sure that the results will be unaffected by firms who may change the status of their temporary workers. On average, employment in firms that do not use temporary workers accounts for 45.3% of total employment, ranging from a low of 27.5% in Bolivia to a high of 80.1% in Mexico. In summary, the results from tables 5 and 6 suggest that some of the effects of labor reform reported in table 4 may involve re-classifying workers from temporary to permanent. The result that making labor regulations more flexible will lead to larger increases in net employment in countries that currently have more rigid regulations appears somewhat more likely to be driven by these changes in status. Nevertheless there is no evidence that pro-market labor reforms would have a detrimental effect on net employment.
The result that countries with more rigid labor regulations would experience larger increases both in hires and in fires is quite robust to excluding firms that employ temporary workers.
Conclusions
I find that labor-market reforms that make regulations more flexible will likely lead to an increase in aggregate employment, at least for permanent employees. Given the vast empirical literature on the effects of rigid labor regulations on employment, the results on net employment changes from the current paper can be viewed as yet another confirmation of the findings of a well-established literature.
The novelty of this paper is to study how net employment increases would be achieved after pro-market labor reform. I find that the post-reform increases in aggregate employment would be associated with increases in employee dismissals. Naturally, these increased dismissals would be more than compensated for by the post-reform increases in hires. Although I do not analyze productivity in this paper, it is logical to conjecture that pro-market labor reforms would lead to productivity gains as workers are more efficiently allocated to firms.
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The first policy implication is that advocates for incumbent workers may be quite rational in opposing market-based labor reforms despite the gains to aggregate employment and productivity. To the extent that unions represent workers who currently have jobs that are protected by the existing rigidities, they may be representing the best interests of their constituents by opposing these reforms.
The natural next question to ask is whether there is a way to achieve the efficiency gains and gains in aggregate employment that are associated with pro-market labor reforms in a way that is more palatable to incumbent employees concerned about the losses of their jobs? One may consider an unemploymentinsurance scheme as a way to offer protection to those who are dismissed from their firms in a way that would not reduce the efficiency of the labor market. In fact, as pointed out by Acemoglu and
Shimer (2000), unemployment insurance may provide social protection in an efficiency-enhancing way since unemployment insurance allows unemployed workers to search longer and therefore find jobs for which they are particularly well suited.
Indeed Chile, the country that is ranked as having the most flexible labor regulations among the 14 countries studied in this paper, has adopted a successful unemployment-insurance system. In this sense one can say that Chile has obtained labor-market flexibility while securing protection for their workers.
Chile has chosen a way to offer social protection to its workers in a way that does not hinder the efficient working of the labor market.
This paper reinforces a literature that offers considerable empirical support to the hypothesis that pro-market labor reforms increase aggregate employment. This paper also, however, demonstrates in a clear way that these labor reforms will likely displace some workers despite the aggregate gains. A reform package that takes into account the welfare of these displaced workers may have a better chance of being approved. 
